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EXPLOITING BORDERS: THE POLITICAL





Once they cross the border . .. They come into cities such as
Hazleton. It's like a cancer.
- Hazleton Mayor Louis J. Barletta, May 20061
The system is broken, the border is broken. We all know what
we need . .. People in Arizona have made it very, very clear.
Let's talk about the problem that is at hand.
Let's secure the border.
- Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, July 20102
I. INTRODUCTION
Four years prior to Arizona's passage of one of the most far-
reaching pieces of anti-Latino immigrant legislation signed into
law in decades,3 demands to "seal off the border"4 were being
made thousands of miles from the U.S.-Mexico divide. In 2006,
Hazleton, Pennsylvania passed equally harsh legislation aimed at
keeping undocumented immigrants out of their community. Dur-
ing this time, commentators described the local backlash in Ha-
t This article is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation
under Grant No. 0719602.
* Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social
Work, University of Dayton.
** Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, Univer-
sity of Delaware, Newark.
1. Kent Jackson, Ferdinand: Time to Seal off Border, STANDARD-SPEAKER,
May 17, 2003, at 17.
2. Jim Cross, Brewer: Obama Immigration Speech "Helpless," KTAR (July 2,
2010), at http://ktar.com/?nid=6&sid=1310824.
3. We are referring here to SB 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010), Arizona
Sess. Laws Ch. 113, as amended by HB 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Sess., Arizona Session
Laws Ch. 211. For a discussion on how SB 1070 legally sanctions racial profiling, see
Gabriel J. Chin, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Toni Massaro & Marc L. Miller, A Legal
Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070 (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discus-
sion Paper No. 10-24, Aug. 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1617440.
4. Jackson, supra note 1.
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zleton and other small cities across the United States as akin to
"the opening of a deep and profound fissure in the American
landscape" 5 wherein "all immigration politics is local." 6 Yet, as
the so-called "immigration problem" returns to its point of origin
and the actual U.S.-Mexico border reclaims its place as the popu-
lar political referent from the more imaginary yet equally racial-
ized borders of homogeneous interior cities, it appears that
neither the Arizona law nor previous local-level legislation re-
present a "new" trend but rather an intensification of America's
growing anti-Latino immigrant backlash.
Mayor Barletta's likening of border-crossers to an invasive
disease that threatens to destroy the body politic plays on the
racist fears of the white majority. Perhaps, however, the more
troubling aspect of this sort of anti-immigration rhetoric stems
from what was left out as the debate traveled from Arizona to
Hazleton and back: particularly, the broader political-economic
context that brought exploited Latino/a immigrant populations
to economically distraught places like Hazleton in the first place.
While politicians like Mayor Barletta and Governor Brewer ex-
ploit the border for its negative cultural associations, they are in
effect enabling the exploitation of immigrant laborers to continue
unencumbered by diverting attention away from an unforgiving
pro-corporate economic order that relies on inexpensive immi-
grant labor to the detriment of American workers and immi-
grants alike.
Drawing from ongoing ethnographic sociolegal research7
that explores anti-immigrant backlash in Hazleton, this article
seeks to highlight a much more complex story than is typically
heard in the public debate on immigration. We argue that na-
tional economic policies incentivizing the exploitation of immi-
grant labor have transformed state law and community-level
development by creating faltering local economies primed for
backlash as companies and business increasingly rely on ex-
5. Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 5, 2007, at 33.
6. Id. at Magazine Cover Page.
7. This paper draws from author Jamie Longazel's ethnographic research on
the community-level politics surrounding Hazleton's Illegal Immigration Relief Act
("IIRA"). See Jamie Longazel, I've Lost My City: Law, Community, and Immigra-
tion Under Colorblind Neoliberalism (Mar. 22, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Del.) (examining the political economic factors leading to the
attraction of Latino/a immigrants to Hazleton and, ultimately, to passage of the
IIRA) (on file with author Longazel). See also BENJAMIN FLEURY-STEINER & JAMIE
LONGAZEL, Neoliberalism, Community Development, and Anti-Immigrant Backlash
in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY Ac-
TIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 157 (Monica Varsanyi ed., 2010) (linking broad
structural changes and Hazleton's nostalgic imaginings of an idealized community to
its vehement anti-immigrant response and also exploring prospects for immigrants'
rights activism amidst anti-immigrant social upheaval).
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ploited immigrant labor to continue and, even, prosper. Unfortu-
nately, the economic realities at the core of the conflict remain
largely absent or obscured both in local-level debates on immi-
gration and in legal intervention aimed at defeating discrimina-
tory ordinances. Given the current state of our national, state,
and local economies, there remains little reason to believe that
subsequent anti-immigrant backlash will lessen any time soon.
Considering this broader political economic context, we see a
pattern of disturbing and hostile ethnocentric backlash that
marks a state of affairs quite to the contrary. We will show that
the recent tough-on-immigration efforts in both Hazleton and
Arizona should be understood not as surprising innovations in
immigration enforcement but rather as natural outgrowths of
deepening economic crises and a veritable racist politics of denial
and subterfuge. As local economies continue to falter, politicians
avoid culpability by diverting public attention away from eco-
nomic crises and corruption and, instead, hyper-focusing on so-
called weakening border security.8
In presenting our case study of Hazleton, we begin Part II by
providing a brief history of immigrant labor exploitation to
demonstrate that U.S. immigration law has long been "firmly
rooted in economic realities."9 In Part III, we describe how con-
temporary political-economic conditions have transformed state
laws in Pennsylvania into corporate protectionist policies that
have filtered down to small, economically unstable cities such as
Hazleton. Specifically, we show how a once grassroots, pro-labor
community development organization in the city has reorganized
into an unintended catalyst for anti-immigrant backlash. Part IV
looks to the defeat of Hazleton's reactionary Illegal Immigration
Relief Act ("IIRA") and argues that community-level activism
on both sides of the debate as well as subsequent legal interven-
tion aimed at defeating the discriminatory ordinance largely ob-
scures key political-economic conditions at the core of
Hazleton's so-called "immigration problem" and therefore
makes any long-term prevention of anti-immigrant backlash in
the city highly unlikely. It is our contention that this analysis
shines a bright light on current conditions in the U.S., especially
in the wake of Arizona's harsh new law. We conclude by reflect-
8. See FuivRY-STEINER & LONGAZEL, supra note 7. See also Krrry
CALAVITA, IMMIGRANTS AT TIIE MARGINS: LAW, RACE, AND ExciusIoN IN Sou-
ERN EUROPE (2005) (conceptualizing the notion of the "useful invader" and arguing
that politicians in the neoliberal era strive to be at once "tough" on undocumented
immigrants and "pro-growth").
9. Krrry CALAVITA, U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses: The Limits of
Legislation, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPEcfivE 55, 65
(Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds., 2004) (1994).
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ing on what we consider to be more promising avenues for immi-
grant advocacy in economically struggling cities.
II. IMMIGRANT EXPLOITATION AND NATIVISM IN THE U.S.:
PAST AND PRESENT
The history of U.S. immigration policy is largely one of eco-
nomic exploitation.10 This is especially true in the case of Mexi-
can immigrants who have historically "formed a reserve labor
pool that could be called up as the situation dictated."'I Yet,
while the prerogative of big business has, to some degree, been
one of immigrant inclusion, periodic waves of restrictionist senti-
ment have contributed to a "periodic tightening"12 of immigra-
tion regulations.
The same laborers brought from Mexico by U.S. officials
when their services were needed (i.e., during wartime labor
shortages or when domestic workers were striking) found them-
selves forced out as political or economic forces dictated. The
government-sponsored voluntary repatriation program imple-
mented during the Great Depression, for example, led to the de-
portation of as many as 500,000 immigrants, many of whom were
deported on government-chartered trains.13 Subsequently, in
1954, the notorious "Operation Wetback" called for the deporta-
tion of over a million documented and undocumented immi-
grants not long after they were invited to the U.S. as part of the
Bracero Program, a U.S. government sponsored initiative that
ironically invited millions of Mexican migrant workers into the
U.S. as a means to offset labor shortages created by World War
11.14 The Chicana/o example illustrates that the pillar of U.S. im-
migration law, especially as it relates to migrants from south of
the U.S. border, has been a reliance on a temporary, indeed, ex-
pendable workforce.15
10. See, e.g., PErER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: Es-
SAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998); CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND Poiuicy RESPONSES, supra note 9; JOHN HIGIAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND:
PATTERNS o AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (2002).
11. Leobardo F. Estrada et al., Chicanos in the United States: A History of Ex-
ploitation and Resistance, 110 DAEDALUS 103, 112 (Spring 1981).
12. CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND Poiicy RESPONSES, supra note 9, at 63.
13. See ROGER DANIELS, COMING To AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 307 (2002).
14. There are numerous historical examples of anti-immigrant policy at the fed-
eral, state, and local level. For example, traces of such anti-immigration policy were
abundant in Hazleton, Pennsylvania during the coal mining era. See HAROLD W.
AURAND, COALCRACKER CULTURE: WORK AND VALUES IN PENNSYLVANIA AN-
THIRACITE, 1835-1935 76-79 (2003).




A. The New Political Economy of Immigration
The exploitation of Chicanos/as and Latino/a immigrants re-
mains. But now there is a new twist. As recent events in Hazleton
and Arizona have shown, "the structural transformations in the
economy that reproduce a continued demand for immigrants at
the same time contribute to restrictionist sentiment."' 6 Increased
deregulation spurred by a largely anti-worker global economy
has enabled corporations to focus almost exclusively on profit
maximization over worker's rights. This equates to an increased
demand for immigrant workers who are willing to tolerate low
wages and poor working conditions, but it also translates into ec-
onomic uncertainty for Americans who see their economic pros-
pects fading as fewer and fewer viable sources of employment
remain available. The result of increased corporate deregulation
is thus record levels of immigrants in the U.S. population' 7 and
the virtual normalization of racist scapegoating and open public
hostility. In other words, exploited immigrants are cast now as
the primary source of increased economic uncertainties that are,
in fact, the result of a dramatically expanded corporate-welfare
driven economic order.
B. The "New" Latino Threat
The scapegoating of Latino immigrants for the prevailing ec-
onomic uncertainty is by no means a new phenomenon in the
U.S. Such misdirected blame, however, is more far-reaching and,
indeed, hostile than ever before. In his important book, The La-
tino Threat, Leo Chavez outlines the contours of the contempo-
rary anti-immigrant backlash, arguing that this backlash can best
be understood as part of a broader "Latino Threat Narrative."' 8
Chavez asserts that this narrative portrays Latinos as crime-
prone, anti-assimilationist (i.e., refusing to speak English), and
determined to demolish American cultural values and reclaim
territory that was once their own.19 He states:
According to the assumptions and taken-for-granted "truths"
inherent in this narrative, Latinos are unwilling or incapable of
integrating, of becoming part of the national community.
16. Id. at 64.
17. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDms, IMMIGRANTS
IN TEl UNITED SrATs, 2007: A PROFILE OF AMERICA's FoREIG;N-BoRN PoPuLA-
TION 1 (Nov. 2007), http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/back1007.pdf (finding that legal
and illegal immigration reached a record of 37.9 million in 2007, where immigrants
accounted for one in eight U.S. residents, the highest level in 80 years, and noting
that only one in 21 residents were immigrants in 1970, one in 16 in 1980, and one in
thirteen in 1990).
18. LEO R. CHAVEz, Tm, LATINo T-IREAT: CONSTRUCIING IMMIGRANTS, CITI-
ZENS, AND THIE NATION 2 (2008).
19. Id.
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Rather, they are part of an invading force from south of the
border that is bent on reconquering land that was formerly
theirs (the U.S. Southwest) and destroying the American way
of life. 20
This narrative is most visible in the broader popular culture, in
the rhetoric of anti-immigration pundits, and in citizen-led media
spectacles that play on misguided public fears of a racialized
other. Peter Brimelow's best-selling book, Alien Nation, for ex-
ample, warns of an "ethnic revolution" 21 as white Americans
gradually become the minority.22 Pundits such as Lou Dobbs, the
infamous former CNN host whose vicious anti-Latino/a rhetoric
is now broadcast in a popular nationwide radio show, devote in-
ordinate amounts of attention to berating "illegal aliens," includ-
ing dismissing the potential for racial profiling in Arizona as
"poppycock and bull." 23 Fox News, the nation's highest rated
cable news network, has likewise contributed its fair share to the
amplification of the Latino threat.24 These pundits portray such
"invaders" as looting the American Dream by taking advantage
of undeserved privileges such as supposedly free medical care
and financial breaks on college tuition. The portrayal of these
"crimmigrants" 25 also shows them clogging the U.S. federal
prison system. Perhaps most viscerally of all, Latina/o immigrants
are portrayed as agents of contagion and hosts of infectious
diseases. 26
What is perhaps most troubling about this new common-
sense is how it plays directly into the hands of corporations who
exploit immigrant labor by distracting the public from the
broader political and economic forces that attracted immigrants
20. Id.
21. PETER BRIMEi ow, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE Anourri AMERICA'S IM-
MIGRATION DISASTER 73 (1995).
22. For a review of this and other alarmist books, see CHAVEZ, supra note 18, at
31, 33.
23. Audio recording: The Lou Dobbs Show, Callers: Mike from Long Island,
NY (July 8, 2010), http://www.loudobbs.com/programhighlightspid=10473.
24. Popular Fox News host Bill O'Reilly, for example, has delivered on several
occasions the kind of rhetoric described in this article. In one episode of his show,
The O'Reilly Factor, O'Reilly lambasted guest Geraldo Rivera over a disagreement
about whether or not undocumented immigrant Alfredo Ramos should be deported
for a non-felony drunk driving conviction. On several occasions, O'Reilly inter-
rupted Rivera's arguments, screaming, "He doesn't have a right to be in this coun-
try!" and "[Y]ou want anarchy!" See video recording: The O'Reilly Factor, http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=-J7xkuLqZAl&feature=related (last visited Apr. 5,
2011).
25. Juliet P. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, & Sovereign
Power (bepress Legal Series Working Paper No. 1635, Aug. 27, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1635/.
26. Peter Hart, Dobbs' Choice: CNN Host Picks Immigration as His Ax to




to the United States in the first place. The result has been the
passage of laws that sanction both economic exploitation and a
growingly hostile de facto nativism. The seeds of the nativist-eco-
nomic exploitation nexus can be traced back to the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"). 27 This
federal law provided amnesty to immigrants who arrived in the
U.S. before 1982 while at the same time requiring employers to
merely demonstrate that they acted in "good faith" when investi-
gating the documentation status of potential employees. The law
thus served a dual purpose of symbolically satisfying the public
demand for a bill that heightened employer accountability while
more realistically satisfying the corporate demand for an in-
creased stock of potentially exploitable immigrants. 28 More re-
cently, Congress has passed a number of so-called "tough on
immigration" laws that place extreme restrictions on both un-
documented and legal immigrants while doing nothing to deter
employers from exploiting immigrant labor. 29
Another striking example of this tendency is the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Hoffnan v. National Labor Relations
Board.30 In Hoffman, the Court focused on whether an undocu-
mented worker who was fired by his employer for being involved
with a union was entitled to back pay. Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that "awarding backpay in a
case like this not only trivializes the immigration laws, it also con-
dones and encourages future violations [of immigration law]." 3'
In doing so, he repeatedly referred to the plaintiff's behavior as
criminal, despite no previous charge or conviction, while neglect-
ing the illegal action taken by the plaintiff's former employer in
denying his right to participate in a union.32 The Hoffman deci-
sion thus exploits anti-immigrant fervor and, at the same time,
27. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 [hereinafter IRCA].
28. See CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND PoIcY Ri-sIPoNSES, supra note 9, at
65-74 (arguing that the IRCA at once adhered to public demands for stricter immi-
gration policy while at the same time enabled immigrant exploitation to continue).
29. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. More recent reports, how-
ever, suggest that the U.S. Department of Justice has begun an aggressive campaign
of "silent raids" on businesses across the U.S. resulting in substantial fines levied
against the employers of undocumented workers. While these "silent raids" do not
typically result in automatic deportation, it is clear that undocumented workers are
being terminated from employment. See Julia Preston, Illegal Workers Swept from
Jobs in 'Silent Raids', N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010, at Al.
30. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
31. Id. at 150.
32. See CATHERINE L. FISK & MICHAEL J. WISINIE, The Story of Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocu-
mented Immigrants, in LABOR LAw SToIuEs, 351, 380-81 (Laura J. Cooper & Cathe-
rine L. Fisk eds., 2005).
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provides employers the opportunity to, as Justice Breyer states in
his dissent, "hire with a wink and a nod those potentially unlaw-
ful aliens whose unlawful employment . . . ultimately will lower
the costs of labor law violations."33
C. Global Competitiveness at the Local Level
As competition in the global political economy intensifies,
both immigrant and U.S. laborers are obviously impacted. Immi-
grants continue to be exploited and many U.S. workers face grim
economic prospects. Yet, the contemporary debate pays these in-
justices very little attention. Instead, U.S. workers and a growing
majority of the American public react with demands for swift and
punitive responses on the part of their political representatives.
Not surprisingly, this places both immigrants and their advocates
on the defensive.
Immigration law and politics at the state and local level have
become remarkably similar. While the localizing of the immigra-
tion debate to places such as Hazleton has been surprising to
some-indeed, as the curious words of Hazleton Mayor Lou
Barletta testified, "Who would believe that a small city that sits
on top of a mountain would have an illegal immigration prob-
lem?" 34-the simultaneously exploitative and nativist character
of local immigration law and politics, we believe, can be seen as
the natural outgrowth of increasing global competitiveness and
the passage of sweeping corporate protectionist policies. These
broader political economic forces have resulted in the passage of
state-sponsored corporate welfare policies that have filtered
down to the local level. Cities in the midst of major economic
transitions, such as old coal towns like Hazleton, must adapt
thereby transforming once pro-labor, grassroots community de-
velopment organizations into direct channels for this new and
unforgiving economic order. It is this dramatic destabilization
and complex transitioning to a post-coal economy that, we con-
tend, has created the political-economic conditions for anti-immi-
grant backlash in Hazleton.
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL BACKLASH
A. Transitioning after the Fall of Coal
Hazleton sits atop the largest basin of anthracite coal in the
world. Its lucrative mining industry made the city an economic
33. 535 U.S. at 156.
34. Mayor Louis J. Barletta, Speech at the Voice of the People USA Rally in




boomtown in the latter half of the 19th century during which
time tens of thousands of European immigrants arrived in Hazle-
ton seeking work in the prosperous mines. Beginning in the early
20th century, however, the city's coal economy would begin a
gradual decline.3 5 By the mid-1950s, virtually all of Hazleton's
mines were closed, leaving many of the city's working-class re-
sidents jobless.
In the 1950s, as the city was rapidly becoming a ghost town,
a grassroots movement attempted to pull the city up from eco-
nomic ruin. The result was the formation of CAN DO, 36 a com-
munity development organization whose mission was to "involve
the entire community, raise money, represent all facets of the
public on its board of directors, and . . . acquire land for indus-
trial park development."3 7 Its founders touted this participatory
and inclusive approach in the local press, proclaiming that they
"would like to have every facet of community life represented"38
and, moreover, they publicly encouraged residents to play a part
by proclaiming,"[T]his is your project and we want you to
participate." 39
The grassroots efforts were a success. Numerous commu-
nity-oriented fund drives brought in enough money to build an
industrial park that, at least temporarily, would resurrect the city
from economic ruin. The city's working-class residents, many of
whom were reluctant to leave their families in search of work
elsewhere, 40 were provided with stable employment despite the
closure of the mines.
35. See ThOMAs DULIN & WAI.TER Licirf, THE FACE oF DECLINE: THEL
PENNSYLVANIA ANTHRACITE REGION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4 (2005).
36. Our discussion and analysis of the CAN DO organization draws primarily
from a vast archive of materials pertaining to CAN DO's history. The CAN DO
archive is maintained by CAN DO in their downtown office in Hazleton, Penn-
sylvania. It includes newspaper articles, brochures, photos and other materials dat-
ing back from 1956 until the present. The CAN DO archive provides a valuable
resource because it is both expansive and up-to-date. It consists of 22 chronologi-
cally ordered "books," each containing dozens of articles and artifacts. Author Lon-
gazel obtained access to the CAN DO archive between December of 2007 and July
of 2008. Detailed notes gleaned from the CAN DO archives are on file with author
Longazel. In this article, we cite the CAN DO archives using the book number and,
where applicable, the date and article title [hereinafter CAN DO Archive]. A more
in-depth analysis of CAN DO archival data is available. See FuiuY-STEINEzR &
LONGAZEL, supra note 7. CAN DO archival data has been utilized in other research.
See also DunIN & Licin, supra note 35.
37. CAN DO, UPON us SiiouitoiRs or GIANTS: Ti- CAN DO STORY 5
(1991).
38. CAN DO Archive, supra note 36, Newspaper Article, Public Meeting on
Industrial Park Scheduled for Next Monday (Mar. 26, 1956), at Book 1.
39. Id.
40. See DAN RosiE, ENERGY TRANSITION AND THEi LOCAL COMMUNIrY: A
THioiRY op SocIETY APPLIED TO HAZLE-rON, PENNSYLVANIA 147 (1981).
2011]1 51
CHICANA/O-LATINA/O LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:43
CAN DO continued to successfully attract industry with the
help of federal and state funds throughout the 1950s, 60s, and
70s. In fact, the organization's efforts were nationally recognized
in 1964 when Hazleton was named an "All-America City." 41 But
in the 1980s, things would change as competition for attracting
industry to an area became tougher than in years past,42 causing
CAN DO to undergo dramatic organizational changes.
B. CAN DO, Inc. Adapts to a New Economic Order
The increased difficulty that CAN DO experienced in at-
tracting industry in the 1980s can be attributed directly to
broader changes in the political-economic climate of the time.43
The rise of a market-based approach to social and economic
problems-commonly termed neoliberalism44-brought about
dramatic changes in the 1980s that made it increasingly difficult
for Hazleton to remain economically viable. In particular, by
transferring state power upwards to global institutions and state
responsibility downwards to local institutions-a process that
Erik Swyngedouw has popularly termed glocalization45-the new
neoliberal order created an economic war4 6 amongst rather than
within municipalities,47 causing dramatic changes to local-level
institutions. In the case of Hazleton, the Reagan administration's
commitment to privatization and devolution resulted in drastic
41. The All-America City Award is a prize given nationally by the National
Civic League (NCL). It is described by NCL as "America's oldest and most prestigi-
ous community recognition award, now in its 62nd year . . . given to ten communities
each year for outstanding civic accomplishments. To win, each community must
demonstrate innovation, inclusiveness, civic engagement, and cross sector collabora-
tion by describing successful efforts to address pressing local challenges." National
Civic League, All-America City Application (2009), http://ncl.orglaac/about.htm.
42. CAN DO Archive, supra note 36, Newspaper Article, Industrial Competi-
tion Tough, CAN DO Official Says, (Jan. 18, 1985), at Book 7.
43. For an in-depth discussion, see FuURY-ST1INER & LONGAZEL, supra note
7.
44. See DAVio HARVEY, A BRImE Hisiroiuv oi, NEoiU13ERAiLISM 2 (2005) ("Ne-
oliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that pro-
poses that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized
by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state
is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.").
See also Pierre Bourdieu, Utopia of Endless Exploitation: The Essence of Neoliberal-
ism, Le Monde Diplomatique (Dec. 1998), http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08
bourdieu.
45. ERIK SwYNGEDOUw, Neither Global nor Local: "Glocalization" and the
Politics of Scale, in SPACES OF GLOBALZArION: REASSERTING TnHE POWER OF THE
LocAL 137 (Kevin R. Cox ed., 1997).
46. Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Eco-
nomic War Among the States, FED. REs. BANK OF MINNEAPOI is ANN. REP. (1994),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications-papers/pub-display.cfm?id=672.
47. Kevin R. Cox & Andrew Mair, Locality and Community in the Politics of




cuts in federal funding for community development, forcing
CAN DO to adapt or fail. CAN DO went so far as to plead their
case against the reduction of federal funds in front of Congress,
but their pleas fell on deaf ears and it was decided that CAN DO
would need to "change its way of thinking in order to
compete." 48
The organization would remain Hazleton's primary eco-
nomic engine in the decades that followed, but their approach
became far more market-oriented. Rather than vowing to re-
present the entire community, CAN DO's new mission focused
only on "improving the quality of life in the Greater Hazleton
through the creation of employment opportunities." 4 9 Moreover,
decisions were made by CAN DO officials that went against
broader community sentiment50 reflecting the organization's
transformation from a grassroots developer to what we have
coined a "neoliberal conduit."5
As manufacturing jobs in Hazleton and in the state of Penn-
sylvania began to decline, 52 CAN DO was forced to rethink its
approach to community development yet again in the 1990s.
CAN DO would support a piece of state level legislation known
as the Keystone Opportunity Zone initiative ("KOZ") that
would prove quite fruitful for the organization's newly restruc-
tured mission. Similar to Enterprise Zones,53 KOZ provides busi-
nesses operating in designated areas a moratorium on virtually
all state and local taxes for twelve years.
48. CAN DO Archive, supra note 36, Newspaper Article, Wright: CAN DO
Must Change Its Thinking (May 16, 1985), at Book 7.
49. Brochure, CAN DO Greater Hazleton Economic Development, CAN DO
Vision Brochure: What Vision, Drive and a Community CAN DO, http://www.
hazletoncando.com/CAN-DO-Marketing-Materials/View-category.html?dir=ASC&
limit=20&limitstart=0&order=date (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
50. In one instance, the CAN DO organization found itself in a legal battle with
a locally organized group of concerned citizens. See Ass'n of Concerned Citizens of
Butler Valley v. Butler Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 580 A.2d 470 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1990).
51. FuiuvU-STEINR & LONGAZEL, supra note 7, at 168.
52. Press Release, American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition, Manufac-
turing Job Losses Cripple Pennsylvania Economic Growth as Higher Paying Jobs
Traded for Lower Paying Jobs: Imperative for Candidates to Disclose Plans to Com-
bat Foreign Predatory Trade Polices and Stop U.S. Manufacturing Job Losses (Apr.
2008), http://www.amtacdc.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/2008/04%2008%2008%20
Pennsylvania%20Press%20Statement.pdf.
53. See STUART M. BUTLER, The Conceptual Evolution of Enterprise Zones, in
ENTE-RPRISE ZONES: Ni-w DIRwcrONs IN EcoNoMic DjvEL1 OPMENT 27, 31 (Roy E.
Green ed., 1991). ("Originally conceived in Thatcher-era England, Enterprise Zone
legislation resonated well with the neoliberal agenda of the Reagan administration,
as the legislation was 'in effect, a supply-side program to save the inner cities: It was
the urban complement to the general conservative strategy of cutting taxes and reg-
ulation to stimulate economic growth."').
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"Pro-corporate" legislation such as KOZ has been touted as
an economic cure-all-indeed, as the "most powerful market
based incentive, no taxation" 5 4-but in reality has caused eco-
nomic turmoil all over the U.S.55 In Hazleton, KOZ resulted in a
dramatic reconfiguration of the city's economic and social land-
scape. Hazleton's economy was largely manufacturing-based in
recent decades, but after KOZ, warehousing plants and other
previously unfamiliar industry (i.e., distribution centers) became
commonplace throughout the city. 56 CAN DO's current presi-
dent has acknowledged that attracting business to the city all de-
pends on the massive tax breaks afforded through KOZ,5 7 and
industry representatives admit that, without KOZ, "they would
not be building [in Hazleton]." 58
One of the most highly publicized successes in Hazleton was
the attraction of Cargill Meat Solutions, a meatpacking plant that
is notorious for the exploitation of immigrant labor.59 Cargill set-
up shop in 2001, brought approximately 1,000 jobs to the city,
and played a key role in shaking up the city's demographics. 6 0
54. David G. Argall, A Policy Analysis of the First Six Years of Pennsylvania's
Keystone Opportunity Zone Program, 1998 to 2004: Enlightened Economic Devel-
opment or Corporate Welfare? 81 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Penn-
sylvania State University), available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?vinst=
PROD&attempt=1&fmt=6&startpage=-1&ver=1&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=
1257801281&exp=04-05-2016&scaling=FULL&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&cfc=1&TS=
1302198941&clientld=1564 (describing how tax-free zones garnered support in the
Pennsylvania state legislature).
55. Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 46 ("Competition among states for new and
existing businesses has become the rule rather than the exception . .. While states
spend billions of dollars competing with one another to retain and attract businesses,
they struggle to provide such public goods as schools and libraries, police and fire
protection, and the roads, bridges and parks that are critical to the success of any
community.").
56. For a discussion of CAN DO's recent industrial recruitment efforts, see L.A.
Tarone, Has CAN DO Lowered Its Standards?, STANDARD-SPEAKER, Aug. 14, 2003
(on file with author Longazel).
57. CAN DO Archive, supra note 36, Newspaper Article, Hazle Allows CAN
DO to Include Township in Opportunity Zone Request (Nov. 18, 1998), at Book 17
(promoting the KOZ legislation, CAN DO President Kevin O'Donnell told a group
of township supervisors, "Businesses ... considering a move to Pennsylvania have
asked the [Ridge] administration, 'show us the Keystone Opportunity Zones."').
58. CAN DO Archive, supra note 36, Meat Plant to Hire 700: Excel Starts Con-
struction on Location Near Hazleton (Apr. 19, 2001), at Book 19.
59. Other locales have hung "not welcome" signs and run television ads to ex-
press their discontent with Excel, a subsidiary of Cargill, locating in their towns. See
L.A. Tarone, supra note 56.
60. In 2000, 95% of the city's 24,000 residents were white. By 2006, a full 30%
of an estimated 31,000 residents were Latino. See David G. Savage & Nicole
Gaouette, Judge Rejects Hazleton Law on Immigrants; A City Cannot Take Such a
National Issue into its Own Hands, He Says, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at A20. More
recent estimates from 2009 rank Hazleton's Luzerne County first in the country in
terms of Hispanic population growth. See Mia Light, Luzerne County has the Fastest-




Offering poor working conditions and significantly less pay than
most factory jobs in Hazleton, the meatpacking jobs were of little
interest to Hazleton locals. Rather, up to 90% of Cargill's
workforce-with numbers as high as 1,300 in 2009-is Latino.61
The Keystone Opportunity Zone initiative vis-A-vis Cargill thus
played a vital role in attracting an immigrant labor force.
When discussions of the so-called "immigration problem"
are addressed in the media, however, KOZ is never discussed.
Instead, KOZ is frequently cast as a panacea for economic recov-
ery with an emphasis on the total number of jobs created in Ha-
zleton and utter neglect of how many of those jobs are low-
paying, anti-union, and dangerous. Even after the legislation's
negative effects were widely felt by Hazleton residents, few have
accused KOZ of being the catalyst behind the city's recent "im-
migration battles." 62 Hazleton city officials such as Lou Barletta,
who is now a member of the U.S. House of Representatives
thanks to the popularity he generated by passing the IIRA, have
instead reaped the political rewards of representing themselves
as both job creators63 and simultaneously "tough on
immigration."
61. Estimates of the number of employees who work at Cargill vary from 800,
according to the Greater Hazleton Chamber of Commerce, to 1,300, according to
accounts we were consistently given while in the field. Regardless, even the lowest
estimates would make Cargill, by far, the largest employer located within any of
Hazleton's industrial parks. Likewise, estimates suggesting that between 70% and
90% of this labor force is Latino would make Cargill the area's largest employer of
Hispanic migrants. See Dan Sheehan & Jose Cardenas, New Culture in Old Coal
Town, The Morning Call (July 24, 2005), http://articles.mcall.com/2005-07-24/news/
3625456_1_pew-hispanic-center-hazeton-s-hispanic-spanish-mass/5.
62. It is worthy to note that since the KOZ program was recently renewed in
Hazleton, critics of KOZ have become particularly vocal. See, e.g., Sam Galski, Di-
rector Fumes Over $3.5M Tax Breaks, STANDARD-SPEAKER, Oct. 2, 2009, available
at http://standardspeaker.comnews/director-fumes-over-3-5m-tax-breaks-1.300784.
Even so, however, most of these critiques focus on the damage done to the local tax
base. Few critiques make the connection between CAN DO, KOZ, and the IIRA.
63. While advocating the exclusion of undocumented immigrants, Mayor
Barletta has acknowledged that he ". . . increased industry within the city with the
CAN-DO project. This project encouraged unskilled laborers to move into the city
where housing prices were low and quality of life was increasing." Defendant City of
Hazleton's Proposed Findings of Fact and Legal Brief at 4, Lozano v. City of Hazle-
ton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 3:06-cv-01586-JMM). The simultane-
ous inclusion and exclusion of immigrant workers reflected in Barletta's support for
CAN DO and his anti-undocumented immigrant stance resembles the politics of
"useful invaders," which has become common in industrialized nations in recent de-
cades. See, e.g., Kiry CALAVITA, IMMIGRANTS AT -TI MARGINS: LAw, RACE, AND
Exci usION IN SouriERN EUROPE, supra note 8, at 48.
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IV. LOZANO V. CITY OF HAZLETON64
Immediately after Hazleton passed its local ordinance,
known as the Illegal Immigration Relief Act ("IIRA"), several
local Latino residents-backed by the ACLU and other promi-
nent national-level organizations-filed suit against the City of
Hazleton. The IIRA would punish landlords that rented to un-
documented immigrants, punish employees that hired undocu-
mented immigrants, and make English the official language of
the city. Plaintiffs claimed the ordinance was discriminatory and
an unconstitutional encroachment on federal power. Judge James
M. Munley, a federal court judge, agreed, ruling that the IIRA
was unconstitutional. 65
Lozano inspired a great deal of mobilization on both sides
of the debate. Our ongoing analysis of the Lozano case and this
subsequent activism reveals,66 however, that despite the court
ruling in favor of Hazleton's immigrant population, neither the
case nor the ensuing activism has been able to adequately ad-
dress the economic realities at the core of this local conflict. In
this context, Arizona's draconian ordinance should come as less
of a surprise as nativism and individual rights dominate the de-
bate and narrow legal interpretations belittle the scope of the
conflict to the exclusion of a vitally needed dialogue on economic
justice.
A. Community-Level Activism in the Wake of Lozano
"Where's the Fence? Close the Border in 90 Days!" These
words were proudly displayed on a large banner that served as
the backdrop for many anti-illegal immigrant rallies that took
place in and around Hazleton in the summer of 2007.67 A local
group, Voice of the People, USA ("VOP"), orchestrated most of
these rallies, which featured local and national activists as speak-
ers.6 8 As the language in the banner suggests, an alarmist, "tough
on immigration" rhetoric characterized these rallies, as speakers
frequently declared, "Illegal is illegal," and warned of the loom-
64. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 620 F.3d 170
(3rd Cir. 2010) (affirming lower court's decision to enjoin enforcement of Hazleton's
ordinance).
65. Id. The ruling on this case is significant as it may serve as the benchmark for
the constitutionality of other such ordinances, such as Arizona's own anti-immigra-
tion law.
66. In this ongoing analysis, we draw from video footage of pro-IHRA rallies,
participant observation from local pro-immigrant activists, interviews with activists
on both sides of the debate, and an analysis of Judge Munley's decision.
67. See e.g., Amanda Christman, Rally for the Fight, STANDARD-SPEAKER, June
4, 2007, at Al.
68. See Longazel, supra note 7.
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ing social ills facing Hazleton and the nation as "illegal aliens"
continue to penetrate America's borders.69
These rallies and calls for tougher border enforcement were
a direct response to the Lozano case and the immigrants' rights
activism represented by the lawsuit. Many activists that we spoke
with said they felt a need to speak up and support Mayor
Barletta against pro-immigrant groups. These individuals por-
trayed the mayor as a small-town underdog70 facing-off against
"the ACLU and 25 lawyers"7' and held rallies to provide "a
venue [for residents of Hazleton] to show their support for what
[Mayor Barletta] was doing." 72 In fact, many of these pro-IIRA
activists became politically active for the first time in response to
the legal challenges brought against the city's ordinance. One ac-
tivist's account clearly demonstrates how Lozano inspired
mobilization:
I am driving around and I see the Fox News truck and I
thought: Oh geez, Mayor Barletta's trial is going on today.
And I pull over and I go out and there is all the pro-illegal
immigration activists. Not immigration activists, illegal immi-
gration activists . . . So I stuck around for an hour, and I left
and I said, something has to be done here. There has to be a
counterdemonstration, a counter show of support for legal im-
migration and against illegal. So I went ahead and I made a
couple of phone calls ... and I said: Look, I am going to have
a rally in support of Mayor Lou Barletta and the IIRA.7 3
While national-level organizations took over the litigating
duties, most local pro-immigrant activists in Hazleton devoted
their time to a group known as the Concerned Parents of the
Hazleton Area-a group whose mission seeks to provide a path-
way for success for students and families in the Hazleton area for
whom language is a barrier. 74 Although group members have de-
69. One national activist speaking in Hazleton warned of impending threats of
crime and disease from countries south of the U.S. border, stating, "These people
have shown a pattern of disrespect and a pattern of criminal behavior coming from
gang-ruled areas where there is no law!" He stated further, "We are getting four to
ten active TB cases rushing across our southern border every night." Video record-
ing: William Gheen of ALIPAC in Hazleton June 3, 2007, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=1MedQM-fTOg (last visited Apr. 27, 2011).
70. To raise funds for the legal case, Mayor Barletta supporters started a group
called "Small Town Defenders," a reflection of the heroic local image Mayor
Barletta has tried to construct for himself. See Small Town Defenders, Welcome to
Small Town Defenders, http://smalltowndefenders.com/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2011).
71. Mayor Louis J. Barletta, Speech, supra note 34.
72. Anonymous Interview with Pro-IIRA Activist No. I (May 18, 2009). In or-
der to protect the identity of interviewees, certain information has been omitted,
including interviewee names, locations of interviews, and any organizational
affiliations.
73. Anonymous Interview with Pro-IIRA Activist No. 2 (June 9, 2009).
74. Concerned Parents of the Hazleton Area, Mission, http://www.cphazleton.
org/aboutus/aboutus.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2011).
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nied the organization being a direct response to the ordinance,
their group's mission appears to be geared toward overcoming
the negative perceptions of Latinos that the ordinance has cast.7 5
Among other things, the group has worked toward its goal by
teaching English, providing translators, and observing English as
a Second Language ("ESL") classrooms to ensure quality
teaching.
The Lozano-inspired activism that took place in Hazleton
thus aspires to what might best be termed conventional immigra-
tion wisdom. As one pro-IIRA activist acknowledged, their activ-
ism was "directed at 'illegals' themselves, not at places of
employment." 76 At the same time, many members of Concerned
Parents seemed unwilling to provide an economic critique. Mem-
bers often spoke of the long hours and strenuous working condi-
tions that immigrants faced at Cargill and in other harsh factory
settings, but few were willing to criticize these practices as so-
cially and economically unjust. Instead, activists brought up these
conditions to make the point that additional services were
needed.77
Not surprisingly, post-Lozano activism has done very little
to mobilize activists to confront the real economic challenges at
the core of Hazleton's so-called "battle against immigration." To
the contrary, our analysis suggests that Lozano may have aggra-
vated rather than eased the conflict on the ground. Anti-Latina/o
discrimination is still rampant while economic critique is perhaps
less accessible to Hazleton residents now than it was when the
conflict began. Locals are concerned with "sealing off the bor-
der" rather than the deeper economic uncertainties they face.
This is particularly disturbing because it comes at a time when
Hazleton's economic problems continue to worsen. Manufactur-
ing jobs continue to decline, unemployment is skyrocketing, and
75. Between April and June 2009, in studying the pro-immigrant activism that
followed Lozano, author Jamie Longazel attended a number of Concerned Parents
meetings. Extensive ethnographic field notes were taken at each of these meetings
and such notes are on file with the author Longazel. For a more detailed analysis, see
Longazel, supra note 7 (arguing that the emergence of the Concerned Parents group
can be understood as a natural outgrowth of the politics that transpired following
the passage of the IIRA).
76. Anonymous Interview with Pro-IIRA Activist No. 3 (July 26, 2009).
77. For example, some members of Concerned Parents explained that because
parents were often working twelve or more hours a day in the factory, there was no
one around to make sure their children got home from school safely. Rather than
critiquing the long hours that immigrant laborers faced, the group instead helped the




the IIRA's exorbitant legal fees have burdened the city with an
unmanageable debt.78
B. The Limits of Lozano
As discussed above, in order to overcome the devastating
effects brought on by the demise of the coal industry, Hazleton
turned to a piece of legislation that ultimately had the effect of
attracting an easily exploitable immigrant labor force to the city.
But the legal legacy of Hazleton's anti-immigrant backlash sug-
gests nothing of this sort. Instead, the precedent set by what hap-
pened in Hazleton came from Judge Munley's Lozano ruling-a
ruling that ignored the key circumstances that led to dramatic
economic upheaval in the city and failed to provide Hazleton's
Latino population with any real recourse.
In her article, Justice as Told by Judges, political scientist
Doris Marie Provine provides a compelling and instructive ac-
count of the Lozano decision.79 She rightly points out that
"Judge Munley's opinion entirely avoids the dilemmas that face
small communities in adjusting to large numbers of new re-
sidents" and "will not settle the issues at stake" because "[1]egal
decisions frame disputes too narrowly to satisfy the yearning for
justice that moves people who believe they have suffered serious
harm."80 Ultimately, Judge Munley ruled that Hazleton had
usurped the federal government's power to regulate immigration,
but what real-life implications would this decision have? The eth-
nic conflict is unlikely to subside and embryonic immigrants'
rights organizations like Concerned Parents are confronted with
economic prospects that remain grim.
The real legacy of Lozano is thus its narrow rights-based ap-
proach and neglect of the deeper economic injustices that drove
the passage of the IIRA in the first place. In a Lexis search of
over 100 law review articles that mention the Hazleton case, we
found that almost all pertain directly to the narrow question of
preemption addressed by Munley. And while some did see the
78. According to the Pennsylvania Center for Workforce & Information Analy-
sis, the average number of Luzerne County residents employed in the manufacturing
sector has decline each year since 1975. Moreover, as of July 2010, Hazleton's unem-
ployment rate is higher than any other city in Pennsylvania. See Jim Dino, Hazle-
ton's Unemployment Highest in Pa., Citizen's Voice (July 7, 2010), http://citizens
voice.com/news/hazleton-s-unemployment-highest-in-pa-1.879835#axzzllxr82tlc].
Finally, the City of Hazleton is expected to pay $2.4 million in attorney fees to plain-
tiffs challenging the IIRA. See Terrie Morgan-Besecker, Legal Bills May Sock Ha-
zleton, The Times-Leader (May 8, 2009), http://www.timesleader.com/news/Legal
bills may-sockHazleton 05-08-2009.html.
79. See Doris M. Provine, Justice as Told by Judges: The Case of Litigation Over
Local Anti-Immigrant Legislation, 3 S rue. IN Soc. Jus-r. 231 (2009), available at
http://www.phaenex.uwindsor.calojs/leddy/index.php/SSJ/article/view/ 693/23 47.
80. Id. at 242.
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case in a slightly different light (i.e., a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause), not a single law review article we reviewed took
into consideration the role of other areas of law (i.e., economic
development law) in perpetuating the backlash."' This is not to
say that preemption was somehow irrelevant to this case, but
rather to point out that abstract legal concepts more generally
are unable to fully grasp the realities of social conflicts as they
are experienced on the ground, nor are they able to account for
and resolve the complexities that arise in cases such as
Hazleton's.
This is most evident in the irony that Munley's decision re-
lied on the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and a sub-
sequent determination made in Hoffman that the IRCA
represents a "comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employ-
ment of illegal aliens in the United States." 8 2 As we have argued
here, both the IRCA and Hoffman are striking examples of the
very legal developments that contribute to the simultaneous
criminalization and exploitation of immigrants in the U.S. today.
In other words, the processes at the core of Hazleton's conflict
were further validated as the discriminatory ordinance was struck
down.
Given the law's unwillingness or inability to tackle the com-
plexities inherent in local and state level immigration conflicts,
we can only expect such social upheaval to continue. Arizona's
recent tough-on-immigration stance is a case in point. The rheto-
ric coming out of Arizona is some of the harshest we have seen in
decades and, although the Obama administration has decided to
file suit against the state, all signs are suggesting that such litiga-
tion will have little substantive impact. Just as Lozano had the
unintended consequence of amplifying the local-level conflict,
evidence of a backlash is already emerging over the administra-
tion's decision to take legal action. 83 And even if the bill is ruled
81. In reviewing the content of these law review articles, we are not criticizing
the validity of the legal arguments that these reviews make. That is to say, we are not
arguing that the authors of these articles were somehow in the wrong for choosing to
discuss the Lozano case the way that they did. Instead, our intention here is to pro-
vide a more general critique of law by arguing that abstract legal concepts such as
preemption often leave the law incapable of addressing real-life social conflict.
82. 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
83. A Gallop Poll found that 50% of Americans opposed the Obama adminis-
tration's decision to file suit against Arizona's immigration law compared to only
33% in support. See Frank Newport, Americans Oppose Federal Suit Against Ariz.
Immigration Law, GALLUP (July 9, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141209/
Americans-Oppose-Federal-Suit-Against-Ariz-Immigration-Law.aspx?utm-source=
alert&utmmedium=email&utm-campaign=syndication&utmcontent=morelink&
utm-term=politics. See also David Runk, 9 States Back Arizona Immigration Law
Against Feds, HuffPost Politics (July 14, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
07/14/arizona-immigration-lawsuit-9-states n_646997.html (highlighting Michigan
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unconstitutional, we would expect the perpetual denial of the
broader economic conditions at the core of these conflicts to con-
tinue as the debate shifts in emphasis from border security to
narrow legal questions of preemption. In short, there is little rea-
son to be hopeful about quelling anti-immigrant fervor and the
exploitation of immigrant labor has shown no signs of stopping.
V. CONcLusioN
The Hazleton case demonstrates how insidious economic ex-
ploitation is masked by a so-called "battle over immigration."
Just as the American southwest historically "had its own source
of readily available and exploitable labor in the colonized Mexi-
cans," 84 globalization creates a similar labor pool as it places
communities across the United States in a position where they
become dependent on corporations that exploit immigrant labor.
We might then also expect Lozano to further divert atten-
tion from the deeper economic crisis that exploits Hazleton's
white working class and Latino immigrant laborers alike. This is
not to say that we are blaming the activists and attorneys who
defeated a discriminatory ordinance. Rather, we are not optimis-
tic about the efficacy of this strategy for long-term social change
and the prevention of future anti-immigrant backlash. A focus
on individual rights will, in all likelihood, entrench the status quo
or perhaps catalyze additional social upheaval.
If the harsh economic realities facing communities are to
stop being ignored, activists must work to bring them to the fore-
front of local politics. Such activism can begin by being critical of
community economic development decisions and advocating for
more direct involvement by community members themselves.
This is challenging given the long history of community develop-
ment organizations exploiting the working class's demand for
good-paying jobs by advocating a powerful nostalgic rhetoric that
emphasizes past economic triumphs as a means to gain public
support for economic decisions.85 In the case of Hazleton, CAN
DO officials ignored the community. 86 Instead, the organiza-
tion's corporate imperatives set forth by KOZ were its "brass
Attorney General Mike Cox' filing a brief on behalf of nine states supporting Ari-
zona's immigration law).
84. Estrada et al., supra note 11, at 112.
85. See Cox & Mair, supra note 47, at 307 (noting that locally dependent eco-
nomic development groups often exploit the working-class need for attaining gainful
employment while at the same time utilizing nostalgic images of past triumphs in
order to gain support for their otherwise controversial economic development
decisions).
86. When questioned about the arrival of the immigrant labor force, CAN DO
officials distanced themselves from the debate, noting that they are "a private organ-
ization . . . not a public entity." L.A. Tarone, supra note 56.
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ring"87 for attracting industry. Never once did CAN DO organize
forums for community members that focused on the challenges
of attracting good jobs to the region. Although clearly driven by
the prevailing economic order and the allure of KOZ, CAN DO
failed to engage Hazleton's working class and instead hid behind
its own pro-growth rhetoric and nostalgic past of economic pros-
perity. Thus, CAN DO effectively closed the door on locally-
owned investment alternatives, which would have had "the effect
of pumping money into a local economy, in contrast to the ex-
traction of capital to corporate headquarters elsewhere." 8
It is especially ironic that CAN DO failed to engage Hazle-
ton's growing population of Latina/o immigrant entrepreneurs.
In the time before the passage of the IIRA, Latino-owned busi-
nesses played a significant role in the revitalization of the city's
downtown, an area that had previously been a line of empty
storefronts. Rather than embracing this as a viable option for ec-
onomic growth, CAN DO ignored pleas from a group of Latino
business owners who feared the obvious economic damage the
IIRA would bring to their customer base. As one business owner
acknowledged: "CAN DO and the Chamber of Commerce are
more receptive to chain stores which leaves Latino small business
owners forced to go their own way." 89
What is most promising about an economic justice ap-
proach90 is that it serves the interests of both sides of what is now
a deeply divisive "battle over immigration." Andrea Batista
Schlesinger lays out her vision of what she calls a pro-immigrant
populism:
[I]f we want to avoid a race to the bottom between native and
immigrant workers, we must create a policy that strengthens
the workplace rights of immigrant workers. Simply put, when
some workers labor without protected rights, the protected
rights of all workers are jeopardized. After all, for most em-
ployers faced with a choice between a legal worker with rights
87. CAN DO Archive, supra note 36, Newspaper Article, Hazleton Allows
CAN DO to Include Township in Opportunity Zone Request (Nov. 18, 1998), at
Book 17.
88. JOHN BOOKSER-FISTEZR & LEAH Wisie, Betrayal of Trust: The Impact of
Economic Development Upon Working Citizens, in COMMUNITInS IN ECONOMIC
CRISIS: APPALACHIA AND) TIE SouTH 96, 106 (John Gaventa et at. eds., 1990).
89. Anonymous Interview with Business Owner (Apr. 30, 2008).
90. Support from local developers for a diverse base of small businesses, a living
wage campaign, and the demand for improved working conditions are obviously im-
portant first steps. Additionally, by emphasizing economic justice at the local level,
cause lawyers and awareness-raising organizations can, among other things, offer
public critiques of exploitative laws like KOZ, push for stricter regulation of corpo-




and recourse, and one they can exploit with impunity, the
choice is all too obvious.9'
It seems quite clear that the growing economic troubles of
the white working class are at least part of the reason for recent
nativist backlash. 92 As such, if the energies of anti-illegal immi-
gration activists were devoted to pro- rather than anti-immigrant
populism, the benefits may actually exceed expectations.93 If im-
migrants are supposedly "taking jobs that Americans don't
want," then it becomes imperative that both groups work to-
gether to improve the conditions and income associated with
these jobs because, frankly, "[m]ore U.S. workers would be eager
to do many of the jobs immigrants do if the wages and working
conditions were more reasonable." 94
91. Andrea Batista Schlesinger, Pro-Immigrant Populism, Tim NATION, Mar. 5,
2007, at 8.
92. One way of interpreting Hazleton's backlash is as a "ceremony of regret."
See David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Inju-
ries in an American Community, 18 LAw & Soc'y Riev. 551, 580 (1984) (describing
the ceremony of regret as "a symbolic effort by members of the community to pre-
serve a sense of meaning and coherence in the face of social changes that they [find]
threatening and confusing." See also Longazel, supra note 7.
93. Activists from predominately rural areas may be able to apply the activities
of larger immigrants' rights groups by taking a political-economic approach to pro-
immigrant advocacy. The Fair Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM) -a national
coalition of groups fighting for immigrants' rights-for example, emphasizes eco-
nomic justice as one of their primary principles. Recognizing that "immigrants can
be pitted against native-born workers in a labor market under stress from general
economic insecurity," FIRM "believe[s] strongly in the solidarity of all workers, es-
pecially low wage workers. Any worker-immigrant or native born-vulnerable to
exploitation threatens the standing of all workers." Center for Community Change,
Principles for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, http://www.communitychange.
org/our-projects/firm-archive/our-work/comprehensive-immigration-reform/princi-
ples-for-comprehensive-immigration-reform (last visited Apr. 27, 2011).
94. Fran Ansley, Symposium: Social Movements and Law Reform: Inclusive
Boundaries and Other Impossible Paths Toward Community Development in a
Global World, 150 U. PA. L. Riv. 353, 396 (discussing the imperative of increasing
democratic control over community development decisions in a way that unites im-
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